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IV. 
I. ST ATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Appellant's statement of the case is accurate, but requires supplementation. 
Following trial, Defendant-Appellant School District moved for an award of fees and 
submitted its Memorandum of Costs. R. Vol. 1, pp. 58-114. Among the items of discretionary 
costs sought, the School District requested that it be reimbursed for "half of the costs paid by the 
District" relating to an arbitration which, the School District admitted it was required to engage 
in pursuant to the underlying contract of employment. R. Vol. 1, p. 104. The arbitration process 
was thus engaged in by the District in order to avoid "additional breach of contract claims," 
beyond those contained in the Plaintiff Terri Sanders Complaint and which were the subject of 
trial. Id. 
In the non-binding arbitration which had preceded the instant lawsuit, the "arbitrator 
determined that the District breached the contract," and ordered several remedies in Plaintiff 
Sanders' favor. R. Vol. 1, p. 126. The arbitration process was, however, "non-binding" and the 
arbitration process did not terminate the case. Id. While the arbitration was conducted pursuant 
to a grievance process included in the contract between the School District and Plaintiff Sanders' 
Education Association, "there was no claim in the Complaint related to the grievance process." 
Id. 
Following arbitration, the arbitrator ordered, on the basis of two-and-a-half days of 
hearing and study time, and transportation and travel costs of $409, total payment of $4,609. R. 
Vol. 1, p. 64. The arbitrator's invoice further provided, consistent with the underlying contract, 
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that the Idaho Education Association (collective bargaining representative of Plaintiff Terri 
Sanders) and the School District, each pay one half of he invoice amount, or $2,304.50. Id. 
The School District paid one half of the total invoice, as ordered, in the amount of 
$2,304.50. R. Vol. 1, p. 63. This same amount was requested as a discretionary cost, and 
awarded by the trial court. R. Vol. 1, p. 139. Nonetheless, in its Memorandum in Support of 
Costs and Fees, the District claimed it was asking for only half of its arbitration costs, though it 
requested and was awarded $2,304.50, the full amount it paid. R. Vol 1., p. 104. 1 
The trial court found that the underlying contract called for payment of one-half of the 
arbitrator's costs by each party. R. Vol. 1, p. 139. But found, contrary to the evidence, that the 
District had paid $4,609.00 and ordered payment of what it believed to be one-half of the amount 
paid by the District, or $2,304.50 as discretionary costs. Id. 
II. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
In addition to the issues presented on appeal asserted by Defendant-Appellee School 
District, the following issues are presented: 
1. Did the District Court abuse its discretion in awarding the costs of contractual, 
non-binding arbitration as an item of discretionary costs pursuant to I.R.C.P. 54( d)(1)? 
2. Is Plaintiff-Appellee/Cross-Appellant Terri Sanders entitled to her attorney fees 
on appeal pursuant to I. C. 12-11 7? 
1 Plaintiff Terri Sanders expresses no opinion as to whether this misstatement was intentional or accidental. 
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III. ARGUMENT 
Since 1996, this Court has stated on no less than 14 occasions that in those cases to which 
I.e. § 12-117 applies, it is the exclusive basis for awarding attorney fees. Roe v. Harris, 128 
Idaho 569, 917 P.2d 403 (1996); Sate v. Hagerman Water Right Owners, Inc. ("HWRO"), 130 
Idaho 718, 724,947 P.2d 391, 396 (1997)(I.C. 12-117 is exclusive basis of awarding fees against 
state agency); Westway Cosntr., Inc. V. Idaho Transportation Dept., 139 Idaho 107,73 P.3d 721 
(2003); Potlatch Ed. Assn. v. Potlatch School District, 148 Idaho 630, 635, 226 P.3d 1277, 1282 
(2010)("1. C. 12-117 is the exclusive means for awarding attorney fees for the entities to which it 
applies."); Brown v. City of Pocatello, 148 Idaho 802, 229 P.3d 21164 (2012); Lake CDA 
Investments v. Idaho Dept. o.lLands, 149 Idaho 274, 233 P.3d 721 (2010); Smith v. Washington 
County, 150 Idaho 388, 247 P.3d 615 (2010); Allied Bail Bonds, Inc. v. County o.lKootenai, 151 
Idaho 405, 258 P.3d 340 (2011); Sopatyk v. Lemhi County, 151 Idaho 809, 264 P.3d 916 (2011); 
Hemy v. Taylor, _ Idaho _,267 P.3d 1270 (January 5, 2012); Keepler-Fleenor v. Fremont 
County, _ Idaho _, 268 P.3d 1159 (January 24, 2012); Arambarri v. Armstrong, Idaho 
_,274 P.3d 1249 (March 8, 2012); City of Osburn v. Randel, Idaho , 277 P.3d 353 
(April 26, 2012); Idaho Transportation Dept. v. Grathol, Idaho 278 P.3d 957 (June 1, 
2012). The only exception to that rule that this Court has identified is where an even more 
specific statute applies and thus displaces the application of I.C. § 12-117. See, e.g., Beehler v. 
Fremont County, 145 Idaho 656, 661,182 P.3d 713,718 (2008). 
Defendant-Appellant Mountain Home School District nonetheless seeks to craft a new 
exception which would allow the utilization of an entirely different statute, but only in those 
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cases in which the prevailing party is a state agency or political subdivision. To craft this 
exception, the Court would have to find that while the plain language of the relevant statutes 
created a bilateral right to fees under specified circumstances, the Legislature actually intended 
to allow the Appellant School District to obtain fees under one standard, but to require all other 
parties to satisfy a much higher standard. This outcome would ignore the plain language of the 
statues in question, is entirely unjustified by the legislative intent expressed in the history of the 
statutes in question, and would do violence to well-established rules of statutory construction. 
A. ST ANDARD OF REVIEW 
The decision to award or not award attorney fees is committed to the sound discretion of 
the trial court, and is reviewed for abuse of discretion. De Wils Interiors v. Dines, 106 Idaho 288 
291, 678 P .2d 80 (1984). However, where the trial court interprets a statute in order to determine 
that it does not permit an award of attorney fees, the court's interpretation of the statute is subject 
to "free review" by this Court. Beehler v. Fremont County, 145 Idaho 656, 658, 182 P.3d 
713,715 (2008). A decision to award costs is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Hayden Lake 
Fire Protection Dist. v. Alcorn, 141 Idaho 307, 314, 109 P.3d 161, 168 (2005). . 
B. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT IDAHO CODE §12-
117 IS THE EXCLUSIVE BASIS ON WHICH TO AWARD FEES IN THIS 
CASE, AND CORRECTLY DECLINED TO A WARD OF FEES 
PURSUANT TO IDAHO CODE §12-120(3). 
Because I.C. §§ 12-117 and 12-120 conflict, the Court must determine which of those 
statutes applies to a case such as is presented here (and already has). Well established rules of 
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statutory construction require the Court to reach the same conclusion it did in Potlatch and 
numerous other cases, that I.e. § 12-117 is exclusive where it applies, including in this case. 
1. Idaho Code Sections 12-117 and 12-120(3) are in Conflict. 
The Idaho Legislature has modified the traditional "American Rule,,2 regarding attorney 
fees in multiple circumstances. At least two of those are relevant here, the provisions of I.C. §§ 
12-117and 12-120(3). 
In Idaho Code 12-120(3), the Legislature provides: 
In any civil action to recover on an open account, account stated, note, bill, 
negotiable instrument, guaranty, or contract relating to the purchase or sale of 
goods, wares, merchandise, or services and in any commercial transaction unless 
otherwise provided by law, the prevailing party shall be allowed a reasonable 
attorney's fee to be set by the court, to be taxed and collected as costs. (emphasis 
added) 
In Idaho Code § 12-117(1) the Legislature provides: 
Unless othenvise provided by statute, in any proceeding involving as adverse 
parties a state agency or a political subdivision and a person, the state agency, 
political subdivision or the court hearing the proceeding, including on appeal, 
shall award the prevailing party reasonable attorney's fees, witness fees and other 
reasonable expenses, if it finds that the nonprevailing party acted without a 
reasonable basis in fact or law. (emphasis added) 
Idaho Code § 12-120(3), if it applied, would allow the prevailing party in any civil 
proceeding on a contract for goods or service to collect its fees solely because it was the 
prevailing party. Idaho Code § 12-117(1), on the other hand, permits the prevailing party to 
collect its fees only if the non-prevailing party brought or defended the case without reasonable 
2 The "American Rule" generally requires litigants to pay their own attorney fees, abrogated only where an award of 
fees is authorized by statute or contract. Hellar v. CenarrZlsa, 106 Idaho 571, 578, 682 P .2d 524, 530 (1984). 
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basis in fact or law. Both statutes include a disclaimer that they will apply unless the law 
provides otherwise. Thus, in numerous cases, such as the instant one, fees would be available 
under one statute but not available under the other, yielding a conflict of statutes and standards. 
This Court has previously determined that precisely such an outcome places I.C. § 12-
117 in conflict with Idaho's judicially developed private attorney general doctrine, because I.C. § 
12-117 focuses on "the character of the losing party's case," rather than "the value of the 
prevailing party's contribution" to the public good. Roe v. Harris, 128 Idaho 569, 573, 917 P.2d 
403, 407 (1996). The difference in focus noted in Roe was the entirety of the Court's answer to 
the question "whether there is a conflict between I.C. § 12-117 and the private attorney general 
doctrine." 128 Idaho 569, 572-573. A nearly identical difference exists when the Court 
compares I.C. §§ 12-117 to I.C. 12-120(3). Idaho Code § 12-117 considers the character of the 
losing party's case, while I.C. § 12-120(3) considers only the subject matter of the underlying 
dispute. The two statutes are in conflict, a conflict which must be resolved by this Court. Just as 
the Court has previously had to resolve the conflict between §§ 12-117 and 12-121, finding that 
§ 12-117 is exclusive where it applies. HWRO, 130 Idaho 718; Westway Cosntr. 139 Idaho 107; 
Potlatch Ed. Assn., 148 Idaho 630. 
a. The Appellant's Attempt to Harmonize the Statutes Actually 
Results in Ignoring Parts of Both Statutes Depending on the 
Outcome of a Particular Case. 
The Appellant School District urges this Court to "harmonize" § § 12-117 with 12-120(3) 
by holding that while § 12-117 governs fee awards against school districts and other political 
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subdivisions (including in contract cases such as Potlatch), § 12-120(3) should govern fee 
awards in favor of school districts and political subdivisions in cases involving contracts. 
Appellant's Brief, pp. 8, 14.25. Far from "harmonizing" the two statutes, this approach merely 
ignores one statute when it is convenient to do so in the interests of the School District, and 
ignores the other statute when it is not convenient to do so. 
Idaho Code § 12-120(3) provides for shifting of fees whenever the underlying case 
involves a claim on an account, pursuant to a contract or based generally on a commercial 
transaction. It applies, by its own terms, to many types of parties, including individuals such as 
Appellee Terri Sanders, corporations, partnerships, associations and political subdivisions. 
Undoubtedly, by its plain language and in the absence of any other statutory or common law 
provision to the contrary, it would provide for a fee award to prevailing party who brought suit 
against a school district or other political subdivision, as well as to a school district or political 
subdivision who prevailed against any other type of party. 
Idaho Code § 12-117 provides for a fee award to a prevailing party in a case specifically 
between a person and any state agency, or political subdivision of the state, and only if the non-
prevailing party brought or defended the case without basis in law or fact. By its plain language 
it provides for a fee award either to or against a public entity party and. 
Appellant School District would 'harmonize" these statutes by ignoring their bilateral 
character, treating § 12-117 as providing only for fee awards against political subdivisions, and § 
12-120(3) as providing only for fee awards against persons who sue political subdivisions. In 
RESPONDENT CROSS-APPELLANT'S BRIEF-7 
other words, the District would have this Court recognize only half of each statute, and declare 
that a "harmonization" of the conflicting standards. 
b. The Appellant's Proposed "Harmonization" of the Statutes 
Ignores the Legislature's Obvious Intent as Expressed by the 
History of I.e. § 12-117. 
The School District's proposed "harmonization" cannot be justified by the language of 
the statutes, as it would require the Court to find that the mandatory language of § 12-117 
providing that a court "shall award the prevailing party" its fees only applies if the prevailing 
party is a person, but does not apply if the prevailing party is the political subdivision.3 
Likewise, the Court would have to hold that the term "prevailing party" in § 12-120 means a 
political subdivision if the political subdivision is the party seeking fees, but does not mean a 
person if that person is the prevailing party. Furthermore, the Court would have to so hold 
despite the express language of both statutes defining the term "party" to include both persons 
and political subdivisions. 
The School District's proposed approach entirely ignores that the Idaho Legislature has 
expressly chosen to make § 12-117 a bilateral statute, governing attorney fees both in favor of 
and against political subdivisions of the state. Upon its passage in 1984, § 12-117 provided 
3 The School District avoids making clear that this is the method by which it would "harmonize" the two statutes. 
But this is, nonetheless, its position. In dealing with inconvenient authority, the District repeatedly distinguishes 
between attorney fee relief granted against a political subdivision, and attorney fee relief granted to a political 
subdivision. This is the method by which the District would seek to distinguish Smith v. Washington County, 149 
Idaho 274, (Appellant's Brief, p. 21), as to which it is claimed that was not a case "where a state agency or 
subdivision is seeking attorney fees against a private individual"; City of Osburn v. Randel, 152 Idaho 906, 
(Appellant's Brief, pp. 23-24), as to which it is claimed "that it is when an individual seeks attorney fees against a 
governmental entity, they are limited to I.e. 12-117"; and, Westway Construction, 139 Idaho 107, (Appellant's 
Brief, p. 18), as to which appellant claims the case stands for the proposition that "a private entity may not obtain 
attorney fees against a governmental entity under any statute other than I.e. 12-117." 
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solely for fee awards in favor a "person" who prevailed in an action against a state agency. 1984 
Idaho Sess. Laws, Ch. 204, Sec. 1. In 1994 the Legislature extended the reach of § 12-117 to 
cases between any person and either a state agency, city, county, or other taxing district. 1994 
Idaho Sess. Laws, Ch. 216, Sec. 1. The potential award of fees remained one-sided, however, in 
that only a "person" who succeeded in an action against the state, a city, county or taxing district 
could obtain fees if the city, county, district or state proceeded without reasonable basis in law or 
fact, but not providing for any award of fees in favor of the state or local governmental entity. 
Id. 
In 2000, the Idaho Legislature corrected the one-sided nature ofI.C. § 12-117. That year 
it modified the language as to who may receive a fee award. While the statue had provided for a 
possible fee award only to a "person" in an action against a state or local government entity, the 
2000 amendment substituted "prevailing party" for person, thus expressly providing that state 
agencies, cities, counties and taxing districts would be entitled to a fee award if "the party against 
whom the judgment is rendered" brought or defended the action without reasonable basis in law 
or fact. 2000 Idaho Sess. Laws, Ch. 241, Sec. 1. The statement of purpose accompanying the 
bill that effected the change stated that the change was specifically intended to allow for an 
award of fees to a state agency if the opposing party's position had no reasonable basis. Id. 
The Appellant School District's attempt to "harmonize" § 12-117 with § 12-120 by 
urging that § 12-117 applies when a judgment is entered in favor a private party, but will not 
apply (thus allowing application of § 12-120 instead) when judgment is in favor of the state or 
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local government unit, would directly vitiate both the language and the stated purpose of the 
2000 amendment to § 12-117. 
Having expressly provided that in cases between individuals and state or local 
government fees may be awarded only if the non-prevailing party's case was without reasonable 
basis in law or fact pursuant to § 12-117, and having provided that in all cases involving 
contracts for service a fee shall be allowed, the Legislature has provided statutes in direct 
conflict. It is thus up to the Court to determine, in the face of such conflict, how each statute 
shall apply. 
3. Because the Statutes are in Conflict, The Court Has Correctly 
Applied Well-Established Rules of Statutory Construction to 
find that I.C. 12-117 is the Exclusive Attorney's Fee Remedy in 
those Cases to Which it Applies. 
a. Idaho Code § 12-117 is the Later Statute. 
This Court "ha[ s] made it clear on numerous occasions that when two governmental 
promulgations are in irreconcilable conflict, the one enacted later in time governs. E.g., State 
Dept. of Parks v. Idaho Dept. of Water Admin., 96 Idaho 440, 530 P.2d 924 (1974); Lloyd Corp. 
v. Bannock County, 53 Idaho 478, 25 P.2d 217 (1933)." Mickelsen v. Rexburg, 101 Idaho 305, 
307,612 P.2d 542, 544 (1980). Idaho Code § 12-117 was passed some 14 years after I.C. § 12-
120. More importantly, the history of amendments to both statutes reveals that the Legislature'S 
most recent action (insofar as is relevant to this case) was to provide for bilateral fee shifting in 
actions between state and local agencies and individuals if, and only if, the non-prevailing 
party's case lacked a reasonable basis in law or fact. 
RESPONDENT CROSS-APPELLANT'S BRIEF - 10 
Idaho Code § 12-120 was created in 1970 to provide for fee shifting only in cases for 
damages involving $1,500 or less. 1970 Idaho Sess. Laws, Ch. 44. In 1975 the Legislature 
added the provision allowing for shifting of fees in cases "on an open account. .. or contract." 
1975 Idaho Sess. Laws, Ch. 65, Sec. 1. Further amendments in 1986, 1987, 1988, 1994, 1996, 
and 2001 yielded the statute under which Appellant School District is seeking an award of fees in 
the present case. 
Idaho Code § 12-117 was not created until 1984 and thus is, in the simplest sense, the 
later statute. But § 12-117 is the later statute in a far more precise sense, as well. The 
amendments creating the language critical to this case also occurred well after the amendments 
to § 12-120 on which the School District must rely to claim an entitlement to attorney fees under 
that statute. 
As originally passed in 1984, § 12-117 applied solely to cases between a "person" and a 
state agency, and provided only that a prevailing person was to receive a fee award if the 
agency's position lacked reasonable basis in law or fact. In 1987, the Legislature amended § 12-
120 to include a "political subdivision" as among the parties subject to that statute and who 
would be entitled to (or liable for) a fee award in a contract case. 1987 Idaho Sess. Law, Ch. 
204. As of that amendment, the result sought by Appellant School District herein would have 
obtained: a prevailing "person" would be entitled to fees if meeting the requirements of § 12-117 
in a case against a state agency (but not against a political subdivision of the state), and a 
prevailing political subdivision such as a school district would be entitled to fees under the 
provisions of § 12-120(3) if it prevailed in a suit for breach of contract. 
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The Legislature amended § 12-117 again in 1994, extending its provisions from cases 
involving a "person" and a "state agency" to cases between a "person" on one hand and "a state 
agency, a city, a county or other taxing district." 1994 Idaho Sess. Laws, Ch. 36, Sec.!. The 
statute remained one-sided, in that it provided fee awards to prevailing "persons" but not to units 
of state or local government. Since § 12-120 had provided, since 1987, that either persons or 
political subdivisions could obtain fees in cases on a contract, that provision still had relevant 
application since at least a portion of its provision (that permitting fee awards to state agencies 
and political subdivisions) did not in any way conflict with the more limited provisions of § 12-
117. 
Critically to this case, the Legislature acted again in 2000. While § 12-117 had for 16 
years provided a unilateral entitlement to fees for persons who successfully sued state agencies 
and (for 6 years) units of local government, in 2000 the Legislature finally made § 12-117 
bidirectional, providing that any prevailing party, whether a "person" or a unit of government, 
was entitled to a fee award on the same terms: whenever "the party against whom the judgment 
is rendered acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law." 2000 Idaho Sess. Laws, Ch. 241, 
Sec.!. For purposes of this case, that was the most recent, relevant amendment. 
The 2000 amendment created the relevant terms of the statute existing today and applied 
in this case.4 That amendment created a bilateral fee-shifting provision which allowed both 
individuals and political subdivisions to seek fees, but only if the non-prevailing party's position 
4 The 2010 amendment to I.e. § 12-117 worked major changes in its applicability to administrative actions and 
actions for judicial review of administrative actions, but is not relevant to this case. 
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was without reasonable basis in fact or law. The Court should find that this latest, relevant 
amendment governs over the older provisions of § 12-120(3). 
h. Idaho Code § 12-117 is the More Specific Statute. 
When reconciling conflicting statutes, this Court has also long applied the rule that the 
more specific statute will govern over the more general. Mickelsen v. Rexburg, 101 Idaho 305, 
307,612 P.2d 542,544 (1980). Appellant School District recognizes this principal, but tries to 
argue that § 12-120(3) is the more specific statute over § 12-117. Appellant's Brief, p. 14. This 
Court has already resolved the issue, finding that as to cases by and between a person and a state 
agency or political subdivision, § 12-117 is a more specific statute than either of the more 
general fee-shifting statutes codified as I.C. §§ 12-120 and 12-121. Tomich v. City o/Pocatello, 
127 Idaho 394, 901 P.2d 501 (1995)(finding that a statute specific to tort claims against the state 
is more specific than a generalized statute applicable to many types of claims); Westway 
Construction, 139 Idaho 107, 73 P.3d 721 (2003)(holding that § 12-117 governs over § 12-
120(3)). 
c. The History of Idaho Code § 12-117 Demonstrates the 
Legislature's Intent to Make It an Exclusive Remedy. 
In Roe this Court determined that the nature of § 12-117, and its requirement that fees be 
awarded only in cases where the non-prevailing party advanced a claim or defense without basis 
in fact or law, demonstrated a legislative intent that the provision provide an exclusive remedy to 
those cases in which it applied. The Court has reiterated the exclusive nature of § 12-117 at least 
13 times since Roe was first decided. 
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The finding of exclusivity is justified by the legislative history of § 12-117. As discussed 
in the preceding section, § 12-117 started as a provision for fees solely in favor of persons who 
sued state agencies, and succeeded in circumstances where the agency's position was unjustified. 
In those circumstances, permitting the state and political subdivisions the same advantages and 
liabilities in litigation as all other parties was an understandable exercise of legislative power. 
That power was exercised in numerous circumstances, including the inclusion in § 12-120(3) of 
political subdivisions within the definition of parties. 
The Legislature has also created fee shifting provisions that are particularized to litigation 
involving government entities. Thus the Idaho Tort Claims Act includes a fee provision (which 
this Court has found to be an exclusive remedy for those cases to which it applies), as does I.C. § 
6-61O(provision regarding suits against sheriffs). The 2000 amendments to § 12-117 created 
another, specific fee-shifting provision that applies whenever a more specific provision does not. 
The history of § 12-117, in the context of the Legislature's enactments of fee-shifting provisions 
demonstrates the requisite intent to make § 12-117 exclusive in those cases to which it applies. 
C. THE DISTRICT COURT'S FINDING THAT DAHO CODE § 12-120 DID 
NOT PROVIDE A BASIS FOR A FEE A WARD WAS CORRECT AND 
SHOULD BE AFFIRMED. 
Limiting the basis for a fee award to the conditions established by I.C. § 12-117 was a 
decision not only supported by mandated by existing law. The trial court did not have discretion 
to award fees under I.C. § 12-120(3), so its decision not to do so cannot be an abuse of 
discretion. In a last ditch effort to avoid this inescapable conclusion, the District raises a new 
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argument, not presented below, that because the named defendant was the Board of Trustees of 
the Mountain Home School District, rather than merely the Mountain Home School District, I.C. 
§ 12-117 does not apply. This elevation of form over substance is inconsistent with a long-
established body of both statutory and decisional law which has recognized that a School District 
can act only through its Board of Trustees, and that a suit against one is a suit against the other. 
A board of trustees is the governing body of a school district. I.C. §33-501. For over 100 
years, this Court has recognized that an action brought against a board of trustees of a school 
district is an action against the state through its political subdivision. Thomas v. State, 16 Idaho 
8, 100 P. 761 (1909). Only a board of trustees is authorized to employ professional personnel in 
school district such as Appellee Terri Sanders. I.C. §33-513. Terri Sanders' contract of 
employment was, as a matter of law, between her and the Board of Trustees. Brown v. Caldwell 
School District, 127 Idaho 112, 898 P.2d 43 (1995). If the District's proposed distinction 
between it as a corporate entity and its Board of Trustees as a collection of person is given 
weight, then teachers would not have contracts with the School District for which they work. 
This is not a result that this Court has ever sanctioned, nor even entertained. 
Potlatch Educ. Assn. was itself brought against both the Potlatch School District and its 
Board of Trustees, nonetheless, I.C. § 12-117 was deemed to apply to the case, to the exclusion of 
any other fee shifting provision. 148 Idaho 630, 635. Roe brought her case both against the 
Idaho Department of Health and Welfare and Jerry Harris, an individual, who was director of 
that Department. 128 Idaho 569. Nonetheless, the Court analyzed the case as one subject to I.C. 
§ 12-117. Likewise, numerous cases in which this Court has found that I.e. §12-117 applied to 
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an award of fees involved boards or officers of a public entity. See, Arambarri v. Armstrong, 
_ Idaho _, 274 P.3d 1249 (March 8, 2012)(suit brought against Director of the Idaho 
Department of Health and Welfare); Henry v. Taylor, _ Idaho _,267 P.3d 1270 (January 5, 
2012)(suit brought against prosecuting attorney as well as county); Allied Bail Bonds, Inc. v. 
County of Kootenai, 151 Idaho 405, 258 P.3d 340 (2011 )(suit named county and county sheriff 
by name); Sopatyk v. Lemhi County, 151 Idaho 809, 264 P.3d 916 (2011)(suit against County as 
well as its Board of Commissioners and Clerk-Recorder); Smith v. Washington County, 150 
Idaho 388, 247 PJd 615 (2010)(defendants included County and county commissioners); Lake 
CDA Investments, LLC v. Idaho Department of Lands, 149 Idaho 274, 233 P.3d 721 (201O)(suit 
named Department of Lands as well as State Board of Land Commissioners). Where a board is 
sued in its capacity as the governing body of a political subdivision of the state, this Court has 
always treated such actions as against the political subdivision. 
D. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY EXERCISED ITS DISCRETION 
TO DENY AN AWARD OF FEES PURSUANT TO IDAHO CODE 12-117 
AND SHOULD BE AFFIRMED. 
The District Court concluded that it would not award fees under I.C. § 12-117 for the 
simple reason that Plaintiff Terri Sanders had a reasonable basis in fact and law for her claims. 
This outcome was bolstered by the fact that she had succeeded in a non-binding arbitration, had 
survived a motion for summary judgment, and had survived a motion for directed verdict. 
Though she was unsuccessful, Ms. Sanders brought a case that required determination by a jury. 
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The reasonableness of a party's case is a matter that should be left to the judgment of the 
trial court that actually heard the case. Halvorson v. N Latah County Highway Dist., 151 Idaho 
196, 254 P.3d 497 (2011); City of Osborn v. Randel, Idaho _, 277 P.3d 353 (2012). 
Defendant School District has not argued on appeal that the District Court's exercise of judgment 
in this respect was wrong, nor could it. The District Court's factual finding that Plaintiff 
Sanders' case had a reasonable basis in fact and law should be affirmed. 
E. THE DISTRICT COURT DID ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN AWARDING 
DISCRETIONARY COSTS FOR AN ARBITRATION PROCEEDING 
THAT DID NOT ARISE FROM OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE 
INST ANT CIVIL PROCEEDING. 
The Idaho Legislature has granted limited authority to the courts to award costs of action 
to a prevailing party. I.C. § 12-1 0 1. The Legislature has likewise imposed limitations on awards 
for costs in a variety of settings, specifically including costs incurred in arbitration. I.e. §7-910. 
This Court, both via adoption of rules of procedure and through exercise of its common law 
powers, has directed the lower courts as to awards of costs. I.R.C.P. 54(d). The District Court, 
in awarding the School District costs of an arbitration proceeding which preceded this civil 
action, and was authorized pursuant to a contract, abused its discretion and should be reversed. 
The Idaho Legislature has authorized the courts of the state to award costs of action to 
prevailing parties. Idaho Code § 12-1 0 1 provides: "Costs shall be awarded by the court in a civil 
trial or proceeding to the parties in the manner and in the amount provided for by the Idaho Rules 
of Civil Procedure." The statute's clear language permits an award of costs "in a civil trial or 
proceeding." Id. The costs of the arbitrator which were the subject of the District Court's award 
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were not incurred "in a civil trial or proceeding." Those costs were incurred in an arbitral 
proceeding which occurred entirely independently of any civil proceeding. See. Sopatyk v. 
Lemhi County, 151 Idaho 809, 819,264 P.3d 916,926 (2011)("civil judicial proceedings are. by 
definition. proceedings in court commenced by a complaint."), citing Smith v. Washington 
County. 150 Idaho 388, 391, 247 P.3d 615,618 (2010)("a civil action must be 'commenced by 
the filing ofa complaint with the court.' IRCP 3(a)(1).") Because the costs were not incurred in 
"a civil trial or proceeding," I.C. § 12-10 1. the award of such costs exceeded the District Court's 
statutory authority. This error oflaw constitutes an abuse ofa District Court's discretion. 
While litigation costs are recoverable in some circumstances under the Rules of Civil 
Procedure, the Legislature has carved out for separate treatment costs incurred in the arbitration 
of disputes. Idaho Code §7-910. part of Idaho's Uniform Arbitration Act, provides: "Unless 
otherwise provided in the agreement to arbitrate, the arbitrators' expenses and fees. together with 
other expenses, not including counsel fees. incurred in the conduct of the arbitration, shall be 
paid as provided in the a\vard." If a party to an arbitration proceeding wishes to enforce, vacate 
or modify an award, including an a\vard as to costs of the arbitration, a specific remedy and 
procedure is provided by the Uniform Arbitration Act. I.e. §7-911 through 914. The School 
District did not. at any time. avail itself of that procedure. Instead. it sought recovery of the costs 
of the arbitrator only after an entirely separate action for breach of contract was brought and 
tried. 'rhis Court has already held that arbitration costs, including the fees of the arbitration, may 
not be awarded in a subsequent civil proceeding. Wo?!e v. Farm Blireau Ins. Co .. 128 Idaho 398, 
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403, 9 J 3 P.2d 1168, 1173 (1996). In that case, this Court expressly disavowed the right of any 
party to seek arbitration related costs in a subsequent civil action for breach of contract: 
Section 7-910 of the UAA grants authority to the arbitrators to award "expenses 
and fees, together with other expenses," incurred during arbitration. absent a 
contrary agreement between the parties. "Other expenses" include both 
prejudgment interest and costs of arbitration. Because costs and prejudgment 
interest are paid only as provided in the arbitration award, they are matters which 
must be brought during arbitration. Wolfe's failure to claim costs and prejudgment 
interest during arbitration precludes his recovery of costs and prejudgment interest 
outside of arbitration. Therefore, Wolfe may not recover costs and prejudgment 
interest incurred during arbitration in his motion for confirmation of the 
arbitration avvard or in his breach of insurance contract action. 
Because the award of an arbitrator's fees must be made by the arbitrator, the School District's 
remedy, if it was unhappy with the arbitrator's award, was to seek to modify or vacate that 
award. That remedy is limited to review of whether particularized grounds to vacate or modify 
the award existed. I.C. §§7-912, 913. 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(l)(D) permits an award of discretionary costs if the 
requirements of that rule are satisfied, including "that said costs were necessary and exceptional 
costs." This Court has previously explained what is necessary for a finding that a particular cost 
is "exceptional:" 
This Court has always construed the requirement that a cost be "exceptional" 
under I.R.C.P. 54( d)(l )(D) to include those costs incurred because the nature of 
the case was itself exceptional. In Great Plains Equip., the Court specifically 
noted that discretionary costs, including those for expert witness fees, were 
"exceptional given the magnitude and nature of the case." Great Plains Equip., 
136 Idaho at 475, 36 P.3d at 227. 
Hayden Lake Fire Prot. Dist. v. Alcorn, 141 Idaho 307, 314, 109 P.3d 161 (2005), overruled in 
part on other grounds by Farber v. State Ins. Fund, 147 Idaho 307, 208 P.3d 289 (2012). In the 
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present case, the trial court abused its discretion by finding that the costs of an arbitrator were 
either necessary or exceptional. 
The arbitration proceeding in this case occurred pursuant to a contract. The arbitrator's 
ruling was advisory in nature, not binding, and had no effect upon this case. The arbitration 
proceeding itself occurred long before suit was filed. Participation in the arbitration proceeding 
was mandated by contract, but was not a prerequisite to or preliminary proceeding to the instant 
suit for breach of contact. The contract did not address costs in the event of litigation 
whatsoever, but only costs on arbitration, rendering superfluous the trial court's reference to 
Zenner v. Holcomb, 147 Idaho 444, 210 P.3d 552 (2009), wherein the parties had reached an 
agreement expressly providing for an award of costs and fees in the event of litigation. Since the 
trial court was empowered only by IRCP 54(d) to award costs of the litigation, it could not, as it 
did, rely on the contract provisions governing arbitration to shoehorn into a litigation-related cost 
award, costs that were incurred before litigation was even initiated. 
The trial court did not make any finding that the costs of the arbitrator were "necessary" 
to the prosecution or defense of this case, whatsoever. R. Vol. 1, p. 139. Nor did the trial court 
make any finding that the costs of the arbitrator were "exceptional." Id. The trial court merely 
concluded that the contract called for payment by the parties of one-half each of the arbitrator's 
fees, but failed to address whether the arbitrator had already ordered payment pursuant to I.C. 
§7-910, and made none of the findings actually required before a court can award discretionary 
costs. Fuller v. Wolters, 119 Idaho 415,807 P.2d 633 (1991). The trial court was limited to 
awarding costs that were "necessary and exceptional." In the absence of express findings that a 
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particular item of cost was both necessary to the litigation and justified by the exceptional nature 
of the litigation, it was an abuse of discretion to award such costs. Id. 
F. PLAINTIFF TERRI SANDERS IS ENTITLED TO ATTORNEYS' FEES ON 
APPEAL PURSUANT TO IDAHO CODE §12-117. 
Defendant -Appellant Mountain Home School District brought this appeal despite 16 
years of rulings from this Court that I.e. § 12-117 is the exclusive basis for an award of attorney 
fees in those cases to which it applies. Counsel for the School District was also counsel for the 
Potlatch School District in Potlatch Ed. Assn. v. Potlatch School District, 148 Idaho 630, 635, 
226 P.3d 1277, 1282 (2010), wherein the Court reiterated the exclusivity of I.e. §12-117. The 
argument made in the instant case, that somehow § 12-117 should apply when a teacher seeks 
fees, but § 12-120(3) should apply when a school district seeks fees is directly contrary to the 
language of the two statutes, the clearly expressed Legislative intent to make § 12-117 bilateral, 
and this Court's repeated statements that it will award fees solely pursuant to § 12-117 when that 
section applies. 5 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The District Court correctly found that because I.C. § 12-117 applies to this case (by its 
plain terms), it is the exclusive basis for awarding fees in this case, and no fee award pursuant to 
5 The School District makes various arguments on the basis of this Court's decision in Sadid v. Idaho State 
University, 151 Idaho 932, 265 P.3d 1144 (2011) in which this Court awarded fees to Idaho State University 
pursuant to I.e. § 12-120(3). The distinction between that case and the present one is obvious: Idaho State 
University is neither a state agency nor a political subdivision of the state, and thus I.e. § 12-117, by its terms, did 
not apply in that case. Horne v. Idaho State University, 138 Idaho 700, 706 (2003). Sadid did not somehow revive 
the award offees pursuant to § 12-120(3) that occurred in Willie v. Board of Trustees, 138 Idaho 131 (2002), it 
simply cited Willie for the proposition that an employment contract is a commercial transaction. The law is clear 
and has been crystal clear on this point since Potlatch. 
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I.C. § 12-120(3) was available. That ruling should be affinned. The District Court recognized 
that it was exercising its discretion in awarding fees under I.C. § 12-117 and made well-supported 
findings of fact that the Plaintiffs case had actual bases in both fact and law, thus preventing an 
award of fees under I.C. §12-117. That ruling should be affirmed. 
The District Court erred when it found that it had discretion to award the fees of an 
arbitrator pursuant to I.R.C.P. 54(d). Arbitration fees and costs must be awarded by the 
arbitrator, if at all, and the sole remedy for such an award or failure to award is via the Uniform 
Arbitration Act. The District Court erred further when it found that $2,304.50 constituted one-
half of the District's arbitration cost, when in fact that amount was the entire arbitration fee, only 
one half of which was ordered paid by the District. The District Court's award of discretionary 
costs should be reversed as an abuse of discretion. 
Because the School District's position on attorney fees is directly contrary to well-
established, and extremely recent pronouncements of this Court, it is without any reasonable 
basis in fact or law. Plaintiff Terri Sanders should be awarded her attorney fees on appeal 
pursuant to I.C. § 12-117. 
Respectfully submitted this 11 th day of September, 2012 
HERZFELD & PIOTROWSKI, LLP 
James M. Piotrowski 
Attorneys for 
Plaintiff-Respondent Cross-Appellee 
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